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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DIA	NASA	SENATE	
DOE	NAVY	TREAS	
DOJ	NSC	USAF	
DSWA	NRC	USMC	

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An important underlying issue may be the public's reaction to the JSP's reliance on mass tactics of violence last spring, although the influence of this will be difficult to determine unless there is a major increase in the conservative vote. The ability of the moderate Democratic Socialist party to maintain its present Diet strength may determine whether

it can continue as a separate political party. The Communists, with only one seat in the last Diet, are concentrating their efforts in campaigning for five seats representing districts where they have run well in the past, but Japanese commentators consider it unlikely that the Communists will win more than one or two additional seats.

SOUTH VIETNAM

South Vietnamese President Diem continues to face serious political problems following suppression of the 10-11 November coup attempt by paratroop elements. He may feel an increased need to reorganize and liberalize his government, possibly with some urging from loyal military officers who came to his rescue. These officers undoubtedly share the concern of the coup leaders over the spread of Communist guerrilla warfare and the adverse effect of Diem's harsh political, social, and economic measures on popular resistance to the Communists.

An official spokesman has announced that government changes will be made. There remains, however, considerable uncertainty over Diem's willingness to carry out sweeping reforms or to relax his authoritarian rule, which now operates through a clique of family and political favorites in the pervasive Can Lao organization.

Diem is reported under pressure from the latter group to punish the coup instigators severely and to crush all known and potential political opponents. The formation of a "People's

Committee Against Rebels and Communists" to ferret out traitorous elements, together with reports of civilian arrests and the temporary suspension of newspapers which printed rebel communiqués, may foreshadow a campaign of repression which could lead to further unrest in Saigon. No retribution is planned against the paratroop ranks, which are considered by Diem to have been "duped"; the responsible paratroop leaders have sought asylum in Cambodia, and this may bring about a flare-up in South Vietnam's already strained relations with its neutralist neighbor.

Most of the loyal units sent to Saigon from the First, Fourth, and Fifth Military Regions have returned to antiguerrilla operations. There has been no significant Vietnamese Communist exploitation of the coup incident, either in Saigon or in areas of guerrilla concentration from which troops were diverted. Although the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been urging stepped-up guerrilla terrorism in the South, the attempted revolt apparently took the Communists by surprise. The revolt, however, will encourage Hanoi in its assessment

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

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
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that unsettled conditions in South Vietnam are favorable to its strategy of eventually toppling Diem through a combination of guerrilla terrorism and political support to anti-Diem elements.

Communist bloc propaganda attributes failure of the coup to the insurgents' inability to "win support of the people" and to exploit the "tremendous dissatisfaction" with Diem. North Vietnam has depicted the coup as merely a conflict between pro-US groups; Moscow has charged that Diem was saved by "active US intervention," but suggests that during the initial stages, American officials hoped to use the insurgents to force Diem to liberalize his government. In portraying the coup as pro-US, the Communists may hope to play on President Diem's suspicions and reservations about US attitudes.

AFRICAN MOVES FOR ADDITIONAL SEATS IN UN BODIES

The African UN members, supported by the rest of the Afro-Asian bloc, have apparently decided on a major effort to reallocate the elective seats on the UN Security Council and the Economic and Social Council so as to permit election of one of their number.

Resolutions to enlarge these bodies now are before the Special Political Committee, and the Africans will probably seek amendments reallocating the seats until such time as the membership of the two councils can be increased. Since it is unlikely that these amendments will get the necessary two-

thirds majority in the assembly, the Africans will then support their own candidates for the elective seats despite the general practice of supporting the candidates informally designated by their respective regions. It is for this reason that the Africans engineered the postponement of the elections, which had been scheduled for 11 November.

The consensus of assembly discussions over the years has clearly favored increasing the elective membership of the two UN councils. Adamant Soviet opposition to any enlargement until Peiping is given China's UN seat has, however, prevented

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